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Resumen
En este trabajo se propone una metodología para el desarrollo de aplicaciones seguras de
procesos de negocios a partir de modelos BPMN Seguros. Es un proceso de tres pasos. En
el primer paso, modelos de ActionGUI son automáticamente generados a partir de un modelo
BPMN Seguro. Estos modelos de ActionGUI especifican tanto el comportamiento a alto nivel
como la seguridad de la aplicación de negocios deseada. En el segundo paso, el modelador
completará los modelos ActionGUI generados con la información relevante de la aplicación de
negocios deseada que no puede ser expresada en el modelo BPMN dado. Finalmente, en el
tercer paso, usando el generador de código disponible en ActionGUI, la aplicación de negocios
deseada es generada automáticamente a partir de los modelos previamente completados.
Palabras clave: Seguridad basada en modelos, BPMN, ActionGUI, BPMN Seguro, SoD, BoD,
MDE.
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Abstract
In this work we propose a methodology for developing secure business applications from
Secure BPMN models. In a nutshell, it is a three-step process. In the first step, ActionGUI
models will be automatically generated from the given Secure BPMN model. These ActionGUI
models specify the high-level behaviour, and the security of the desired business application. In
the second step, the modeler will complete the generated ActionGUI models with all the rele-
vant information about the desired business application that can not be expressed in the given
BPMN model. Finally, in the third step, the desired business application will be automatically
generated from the finalized models, using the available ActionGUI code generator.
Keywords: Model-driven security, BPMN, ActionGUI, Secure BPMN, SoD, BoD, MDE.
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1
Introduction
Broadly speaking, business processes are used to describe which activities need to be completed
to accomplish a specific business goal, in which order they are to be executed, and by whom.
They are very useful for assigning responsibilities among agents (humans or computers) and
for defining interactions among them. BPMN [19] is a well-known language for modeling
business processes. It graphically depicts business processes using workflows, where nodes
represent activities, edges represent activity flow, and gateways represent activity coordination.
Business applications are software solutions ensuring that all the activities which encompass a
business process are completed in the required order and by the required agents. The standard
components of a business application are: (i) a task management window, where agents can
choose the next task (activity instance) to be executed; and (ii) for each activity, a task execution
window, where agents can execute to completion a previously chosen task. The abuse of special
privileges is a serious security threat in many business processes. Secure BPMN [2, 8] has
been proposed as a formal way of integrating separation of duties (SoD) and binding of duties
(BoD) requirements into business processes. SoD requirements prevent a user from executing
two activities with conflicting interest. BoD requirements prevent widespread dissemination of
sensitive information by forcing that two related activities are to be executed by the same agent.
The main contribution of the work presented here is a novel methodology (unpublished yet)
for developing secure business applications from Secure BPMN models. In a nutshell, it is a
three-step process. In the first step, ActionGUI models will be automatically generated from
the given secure BPMN model. ActionGUI [9] is a language for modeling security-aware, data-
centric business applications, to whose design and implementation we have contributed as part
of our work. The generated ActionGUI models specify the high-level behaviour of the desired
business application, based on the information contained in the given BPMN model. In the
second step, the modeler will complete the generated ActionGUI models with all the relevant
information about the desired business application that can not be expressed in the given BPMN
model. In the third step, the desired business application will be automatically generated from
the finalized models, using the available ActionGUI code generator.
Finally, our motivation is twofold. On the one hand, to the best of our knowledge, current
BPMN tools (including Activiti [1] or JBPM [16]) do not support Secure BPMN models. On
the other hand, although these tools generate software from models, they also require manually
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encoding all the details about the desired business applications that can not be modeled in BPMN
and that can not be generated from the templates provided by these tools, including security
concerns, like SoD or BoD requirements.
2
Context
2.1 Model-driven software engineering
As time pass by, software systems grows in complexity and software developers must work at
increasingly higher levels of abstraction to cope with this complexity. Nowadays, modeling
software is a key way for developers to work at those higher levels. The role played by models
in software projects is comparable to the role played by blueprints in engineering projects. In
the long run, a detailed model saves time and money since it allows developers to consider
alternatives, select the best option, work out details, and achieve agreement before anyone starts
building the application .
Proponents of model-driven engineering have in the past been guilty of making overambi-
tious claims: positioning it as the Holy Grail of software engineering where modeling com-
pletely replaces programming. This vision is, of course, unrealizable in its entirety for simple
complexity-theoretic reasons. If the modeling languages are sufficiently expressive then basic
problems such as the consistency of the different models or views of a system become undecid-
able. However, there are specialized domains where MDE can truly deliver its full potential, as
it has been shown [9].
2.2 Model-driven security
In model-driven development, system designs are specified using graphical modeling languages
like UML [20] and system artifacts such as code and configuration data are automatically gen-
erated from the models. Model-driven security [17, 7, 3, 4, 11, 6, 13, 5] is a specialization of
this paradigm, where system designs are modeled together with their security requirements and
security infrastructures are directly generated from the models. More specifically, models can
be used for the following four activities in the development of secure system [5]:
A1. Precisely documenting security requirements together with design requirements.
A2. Analyzing security requirements.
A3. Model-based transformation, such as migrating security policies on application data to
policies for other system layers or artifacts.
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Figure 2.1: Use of Models in Model-Driven Security
A4. Generating code, including complete, configured security infrastructures.
Figure 2.1 depicts these activities and their interrelationships. Designers specify security-
design models that combine security and design requirements (A1). As our modeling languages
have a well-defined semantics, we can formally analyze these designs (A2). When designing
secure systems, security may be relevant at different system layers or views. Using model
transformations, we can migrate a security policy from one model to other models (A3). Finally,
we can use tools to automatically generate code and other system artifacts directly from the
models (A4).
2.3 Data-centric applications
Data-centric applications are applications that manage information, typically stored in a database.
In many cases, users access this information through graphical user interfaces (GUIs). Infor-
mally, a GUI consists of widgets (e.g., windows, text-fields, lists, and combo-boxes), which
are visual elements that display and store information and support events (like “clicking-on” or
“typing-in”). A GUI defines the layout for the widgets, as well as the actions that the widgets’
events trigger either on the application’s database (e.g., to create, delete, or update information)
or upon other widgets (e.g., to open or close a window).
There is an important, but little explored, link between visualization and security: When
the application data is protected by an access control policy, the application GUI should be
aware of and respect this policy. For example, the GUI should not display options to users for
actions (e.g., to read or update information) that they are not authorized to execute on application
data. This, of course, prevents the users from getting (often cryptic) security warnings or error
messages directly from the database management system. It also prevents user frustration, for
example from filling out a long electronic form only to have the server reject it because the user
lacks a permission to execute some associated action on the application data. However, manual
encoding the application’s security policy within the GUI code is cumbersome and error prone.
Moreover, the resulting code is difficult to maintain, since any changes in the security policy
will require manual changes to the GUI code.
2.4 Business applications
Broadly speaking, business processes are used to describe which activities need to be completed
to accomplish a specific business goal, in which order they are to be executed, and by whom.
They are very useful for assigning responsibilities among agents (humans or computers) and
for defining interactions among them [12]. BPMN [19] is a well-known language for modeling
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Figure 2.2: A typical task management window (generated using the Activiti framework [1]).
business processes. It graphically depicts business processes using workflows, where nodes
represent activities, edges represent activity flow, and gateways represent activity coordination.
The abuse of special privileges is a serious security threat in many business processes.[10,
14]. Secure BPMN [2, 8] has been proposed as a formal way of integrating separation of duties
(SoD) and binding of duties (BoD) requirements into business processes. SoD requirements
prevent a user from executing two activities with conflicting interest. BoD requirements prevent
widespread dissemination of sensitive information by forcing that two related activities are to
be executed by the same agent.
In general, business applications are software solutions ensuring that all the activities which
encompass a business process are completed in the required order and by the required agents.
The standard components of a business application are: (i) a task management window (like
the one shown in Figure 2.2), where agents can choose the next task (activity instance) to be
executed; and (ii) for each activity, a task execution window, where agents can execute to com-
pletion a previously chosen task.1
1We are well-aware that this is a simplification. Typically, agents must navigate through several windows in order
to complete a complex task. However, for our present purposes, it is enough to consider this simple case.

3
ActionGUI
ActionGUI [9] is a domain-specific modeling language for developing data-centric applications
with fine grained access control policies. It supports model-driven engineering. More specifi-
cally, it fosters a development methodology that focuses on creating models of different aspects
or views of data-centric applications from which artifacts such as code and configuration data is
automatically generated.
Crucially, ActionGUI supports the principle of separation of concerns. In particular, Ac-
tionGUI models consists of three models:
• A data model that defines the application domain.
• A security model that defines the application fine grained access control policy.
• A GUI model that defines the application graphical interface.
As expected, the security model and the GUI model depends on the data model, since the
former specifies which users can access which data and the latter defines through which graphi-
cal widgets the user will access this data. (Thus, a change in the data model will generally imply
a change in the other two models.) However, the security model and the GUI model are truly
independent from each other. We believe this is in correspondence with what happens in reality:
the security engineer should not be concerned about the application graphical user interface,
while the GUI designer may not know in full detail the access control policy that the application
must respect.
ActionGUI offers the following advantages for developers of data-centric applications with
fine grained access control policies. By working with models, GUI designers can focus on the
GUI’s layout and behavior, instead of wrestling with the different, often complex, technologies
that are used to implement them. Then, by supporting the separating concerns, GUI designers
can make changes in the GUI model without having to agree upon these changes with the se-
curity engineers, and viceversa.1 Last but not least, ActionGUI models are formal objects and
1Of course, radical changes on the access control policy may turn useless a graphical user interface. When
usability is taking into account, the proclaimed independence of the security model and the GUI model may demand
some further discussion.
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Figure 3.1: The ComponentUML metamodel.
therefore developers can reason about their properties. In fact, one can reason about the proper-
ties of each of the models conforming an ActionGUI models. E.g., Is there a valid instance of
the data model? Will a user in a given role ever be allowed to access a given resource? Will a
user ever reach a window from which it could attempt to access a given resource? Furthermore,
one can reason about the properties of the ActionGUI models themselves. E.g., Will a user in a
given role ever be allowed to triggered all the actions associated to a given widget event?
In the remaining of this section, we introduce the modeling languages that we use within
ActionGUI. These languages are: ComponentUML, for modeling data; SecureUML, for mod-
eling the access control policy; and GUIML, for modeling the application’s GUI. To illustrate
the main modeling concepts and relationships provided by these languages, we work through
a running example: a simple chat application named ChitChat, which supports multiple chat
rooms where users can converse with each other in different chat rooms.
3.1 Data models (ComponentUML)
We begin then with ComponentUML, which is the language that we use for modeling the ap-
plication data. ComponentUML also gives us a context to introduce the constraint language
OCL [18], which we intensively use in ActionGUI when modeling both access control policies
and the application’s GUIs.
Data models provide a data-oriented view of a system. Typically they are used to specify
how data is structured, the format of data items, and their logical organization, i.e., how data
items are grouped and related. ComponentUML essentially provides a subset of UML class
models where entities (classes) can be related by associations and may have attributes and
methods. Attributes and association-ends have types (either primitive types or entity types). As
expected, the type associated to an attribute is the type of the attribute’s values, and the type
associated to an association-end is the type of the objects which may be linked at this end of the
association. The ComponentUML metamodel is shown in Figure 3.1.
Example 1 (The ChitChat data model) In our ChitChat application, each user has a nickname,
a password, an e-mail address, a mood message, and a status. The user may participate and be
invited to participate in any number of chat rooms. Each chat room is created by a user, has a
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name, a starting and ending date, and it manages the messages sent by its participants.
The model shown in Figure 3.2 specifies the data model of the ChitChat application, using
the textual notation of ComponentUML.
OCL: constraints and queries
Modeling, specially software modeling, has traditionally been a synonym for producing dia-
grams. Most models consist of a number of “bubbles and arrows” pictures and some accompa-
nying text. The information conveyed by such a model has a tendency to be incomplete, infor-
mal, imprecise, and sometimes even inconsistent. Many of the flaws in the model are caused by
the limitations of the diagrams being used. A diagram simply cannot express the statements that
should be part of a thorough specification. To specify software systems, expressions written in a
formal language offer a number of benefits over the use of diagrams: they are unambiguous and
cannot be interpreted differently by different people, for example, an analyst and a programmer;
they make the model more precise and more detailed; and they can be checked by automated
tools to ensure that they are correct and consistent with other elements of the model. On the
other hand, a model written in a formal language that uses expressions alone is often not easily
understood. The good thing about “bubbles and arrows” pictures is that their intended meaning
is easy to grasp.
The UML notation is largely based on diagrams. However, to provide the level of con-
ciseness and expressiveness that is required for certain aspects of a design, the UML standard
defines the Object Constraint Language (OCL) [18]. Over the last years, the domain of ap-
plication of modeling languages and of modeling in general has evolved to include issues like
domain-specific metamodels definition, model transformation, design model testing, and model
validation and simulation. Most of these new applications make extensive use of OCL.
As part of the UML standard, OCL was originally intended for modeling properties that
could not be easily or naturally captured using graphical notation (e.g., class invariants in a
UML class diagram). In fact, OCL expressions are always written in the context of a model,
and they are evaluated on an instance of this model. This evaluation returns a value but does not
change anything; OCL is a side-effect free language.
OCL is a strongly type language. Expressions either have a primitive type (namely, Boolean,
Integer, Real, and String), a class type, or a collection type, whose base type is either a primitive
type or a class type. OCL provides the standard operators on primitive types and on collec-
tions. For example, the operator includes checks whether an object is part of a collection, and
the operator isEmpty checks whether a collection is empty. More interestingly, OCL provides a
dot-operator to access the values of the objects’ attributes and association-ends. For example,
let u be an object of the class ChatUser. Then, the expression u.nickname refers to the value of
the attribute nickname for the ChatUser u, and the expression u.participates refers to the objects
linked to the ChatUser u through the association-end participates. Furthermore, OCL provides
the operator allInstances to access to all the objects of a class. For example, the expression
ChatRoom.allInstances() refers to all the objects of the class ChatRoom. Finally, OCL provides
operators to iterate on collections. These are forAll, exists, select, reject, and collect. For exam-
ple, ChatUser.allInstances()−>select(u|u.status=’on−line’) refers to the collection of objects of the
class ChatUsers whose attribute status has the value “on-line”.
Example 2 (ChitChat’s entity invariants) To illustrate the syntax (and the semantics) of the
OCL language, we formalize here some entity (class) invariants for ChitChat’s data model. For
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entity ChatUser isUser{
String nickname
String password
String email
String moodMsg
String status
Set(ChatMessage) msgSent oppositeTo from
Set(ChatRoom) participates oppositeTo participants
Set(ChatRoom) owns oppositeTo ownedBy
Set(ChatRoom) invitedTo oppositeTo invitees
}
entity ChatMessage{
String body
ChatUser from oppositeTo msgSent
ChatRoom chat oppositeTo messages
}
entity ChatRoom{
String name
Date start
Date end
Set(ChatMessage) messages oppositeTo chat
Set(ChatUser) participants oppositeTo participates
ChatUser onwedBy oppositeTo owns
Set(ChatUser) invitees oppositeTo invitedTo
}
Figure 3.2: The ChitChat data model.
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example, the following OCL expression formalizes that users’ nicknames must be unique:
ChatUser.allInstances()−>forall(u1,u2|
u1 <> u2 implies u1.nickname <> u2.nickname).
Similarly, we can formalize that the status of a ChitChat user is either “off-line” or “on-
line” using the following OCL expression:
ChatUser.allInstances()−>forall(u|
u.status=’on−line’ or u.status=’off−line’).
Finally, we can formalize that each message has exactly one sender:
ChatMessage.allInstances()−>forAll(m|m.from−>size()= 1).
3.2 Security models (SecureUML)
SecureUML [7] is a modeling language for formalizing access control requirements that is based
on RBAC [15]. In RBAC, permissions specify which roles are allowed to perform given oper-
ations. These roles typically represent job functions within an organization. Users are granted
permissions by being assigned to the appropriate roles based on their competencies and respon-
sibilities in the organization. RBAC additionally allows one to organize the roles in a hierarchy
where roles can inherit permissions along the hierarchy. In this way, the security policy can be
described in terms of the hierarchical structure of an organization. However, it is not possible in
RBAC to specify policies that depend on dynamic properties of the system state, for example,
to allow an operation only during weekdays. SecureUML extends RBAC with authorization
constraints to overcome this limitation.
SecureUML provides a language for specifying access control policies for actions on pro-
tected resources. However, it leaves open what the protected resources are and which actions
they offer to actors. These are specified in a so-called “dialect”. Figure 3.3 shows the Se-
cureUML metamodel. Essentially, it provides a language for modeling roles (with their hierar-
chies), permissions, actions, resources, and authorization constraints, along with their assign-
ments, i.e., which permissions are assigned to a role, which actions are allowed by a permission,
which resource is affected by the actions allowed by a permission, which constraints need to be
satisfied for granting a permission, and, finally, which resource is affected by an action.
In ActionGUI, we use a specific dialect of SecureUML for modeling the access control pol-
icy on data models, named SecureUML+ComponentUML. Its metamodel provides the connec-
tion between SecureUML and ComponentUML. Essentially, in this dialect of SecureUML, the
protected resources are the entities, along with their attributes, methods, and association-ends
(but not the associations as such), and the actions that they offer to the actors are those shown
in Figure 3.4. There are two classes of actions: atomic and composite. The atomic actions are
intended to map directly onto actual operations on the database. These actions are: create and
delete for entities; read and update for attributes; create and delete for association-ends; and ex-
ecute for methods. The underlined actions are the composite actions, which hierarchically group
lower-level actions. Composite actions allow modelers to conveniently specify permissions for
sets of actions. For example, the full access action for an attribute groups together the read and
update actions for this attribute.
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Figure 3.3: The SecureUML metamodel.
Resource Actions
Entity create, read, update, delete, full access
Attribute read, update, full access
Method execute
AssociationEnd read, create, delete, full access
Figure 3.4: The SecureUML+ComponentUML actions on protected resources.
Finally, in SecureUML+ComponentUML, authorization constraints are specified using OCL,
extended by four keywords, self, caller, value, and target. These keywords have the following
meanings:
• self refers to the root resource upon which the action will be performed, if the permission
is granted. The root resource of an attribute, an association-end, or a method is the entity
to which it belongs.
• caller refers to the actor that will perform the action, if the permission is granted.
• value refers to the value that will be used to update an attribute, if the permission is
granted.
• target refers to the object that will be linked at the end of an association, if the permission
is granted.
Example 3 (The ChitChat access control policy) For the sake of our running example, consider
the following (partial) access control policy for the ChitChat application:
• Only administrators can create or delete users;
• Administrators can read any user’s nickname, email, mood message, and status.
• Any user can read and update its own nickname, password, email, mood message, and
status.
• Any user can read other users’ nicknames, mood messages, and status.
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• Users can join a chat room by invitation only, but they can leave at any time.
The model shown in Figure 3.5 specifies this access control policy, using the textual nota-
tion of SecureUML+ComponentUML. For example, the permission DisjointChat authorizes any
user to leave a chat room at any anytime. More precisely, it allows any user caller to delete a
participates-link between a user self and a chat room target (meaning that the user self leaves the
chat room target), but only if the user caller is indeed the user self (that is, the user caller is the
one leaving the chat room target), and also the chat room target indeed belongs to the collection
of chat rooms linked to the user caller through the association-end participates (that is, the caller
is actually participating in the chat room target).
3.2.1 GUI models (GUIML)
GUIML is a modeling language for formalizing GUIs of data-centric applications. The GUIML
metamodel is shown in Figure 3.6. In a nutshell, GUIML provides a language to model widgets
(e.g., windows, text-fields, buttons, lists, and tables), events (e.g., clicking-on, typing-in), and
actions, which can be on data (e.g., to update a property of an element in the database) or on
other widgets, (e.g., to open a window), as well as the associations that link the widgets with the
events that they support and the events with the actions that they trigger. In addition, GUIML
provides support to formally model the following features:
• Widgets can be displayed in containers, which are also widgets (e.g., a window can con-
tain other widgets).
• Widgets may own variables, which are in charge of storing information for later use.
• Events may be only supported upon the satisfaction of specific conditions, whose truth
value can depend on the information stored in the widgets’ variables or with the in the
database.
• Actions may be only triggered upon the satisfaction of specific conditions, whose truth
value can depend on the information stored in the widgets’ variables or in the database.
• Actions may take their arguments (values that instantiate their parameters) from the in-
formation stored in the widgets’ variables or in the database.
The GUIML metamodel’s invariants specify: (i) for each type of widget, the “default” variables
that widgets of this type always own; (ii) for each type of widget, the type of events that widgets
of this type may support; and (iii) for each type of action, the arguments that actions of this type
require, as well as the arguments (if any) that these actions may additionally take. In particular,
the invariants of GUIML’s metamodel formalize, among others, the following constraints about
the different types of widgets:
• Windows. They can contain any type of widget, except windows. Windows are not con-
tained in any widget.
• Text-field. They can be typed-in. By default, each text-field owns a variable text of type
string, which stores the last string typed-in by the user. The value of the variable text is
permanently displayed in the text-field.
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role Admin {
permission AnyUser context ChatUser{
create
delete
read nickname
read email
read moodMsg
read status
}
}
role User{
permission SelfUser context ChatUser{
fullAccess nickname constrainedBy [self=caller]
fullAcesss password constrainedBy [self=caller]
fullAcesss email constrainedBy [self=caller]
fullAcesss moodMsg constrainedBy [self=caller]
fullAccess status constrainedBy [self=caller]
}
permission OtherUser context ChatUser{
read nickname
read moodMessage
read status
}
permission JointChat context ChatUser{
add participates constrainedBy [self=caller and caller.invitedTo−>includes(target)]
}
permission DisjointChat context ChatUser{
remove participates constrainedBy [self=caller and caller.participates−>includes(target)]
}
}
Figure 3.5: The ChitChat security model.
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Figure 3.6: The GUIML metamodel.
• Button. They can be clicked-on.
• List. They contain exactly one text-field. By default, each list owns a variable rows of
type collection. A list displays as many rows as elements are in the collection stored by
the variable rows, each row containing exactly one instance of the text-field contained by
the list. By default, each instance of this text-field owns a variable row whose value is the
element associated to this row from those stored by the variable rows. Finally, by default,
each list owns a variable selected that holds the element associated to the last row selected
by the user.
• Combo-box. They are similar to lists, except that rows are displayed in a drop-down box.
• Table. They are similar to lists, except that they can contain any number of text-fields,
buttons, lists, or even tables.
Also, the invariants of GUIML’s metamodel formalize, among others, the following invari-
ants about the different types of actions:
• Create. It creates a data item in the database. It takes two arguments: the type of the new
data item (type) and the variable that will store this element for later reference (variable).
• Delete (entities). It deletes a data item in the database. It takes as argument the element
to be deleted (object).
• Read. It reads the value of a data item’s attribute in the database. It takes three arguments:
the data item whose property is to be read (object); the property to be read (attribute); and
the variable that will store, for later reference, the value read (variable).
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• Update. It modifies the value of a data item’s attribute in the database. It takes three
arguments: the data item whose attribute is to be modified (object); the attribute to be
modified (attribute); and the new value (value).
• Create (association-ends). It creates a new link in the database between two data items. It
takes three arguments: the source data item (sourceObject); the target data item (targetO-
bject); and the association-end (associationEnd) through which the target data item will
be linked to the source data item.
• Delete (association-ends). It deletes a link in the database between two data items. It takes
three arguments: the source data item (sourceObject); the target data item (targetObject);
and the association-end (associationEnd) from where the target data item will be removed.
• Open. It opens a window. It takes as argument the window to be opened (target); addi-
tionally, for any of this window’s variables, it can take as argument a value to be assigned
to this variable when opening the window.
• Back. It goes back to the window from which a window was open.
• Set. It assigns a new value to a widget’s variable. It takes two arguments: the variable
(target) and the value to be assigned to this variable (value).
Finally, actions’ conditions and arguments are specified in GUIML models using OCL,
extended with the widget’s variables. As expected, when evaluating an OCL expression that
contains a widget’s variable, the value of the corresponding subexpression is the value currently
stored in the variable. In case of ambiguity, a widget’s variable is denoted by its name, prefixed
by the name of its widget (followed by a dot). Also, in case of ambiguity, the name of a
widget is prefixed by the name of its container (followed by a dot). Notice that, within the same
containers, widgets have unique names. Moreover, a widget’s variable can only be used within
the window that contains its widget, either directly or indirectly.
Example 4 (The ChitChat login window) To continue with our running example, consider the
following interface for allowing a registered user to login into the ChitChat application: a
window loginWi containing:
• a writable text-field nicknameEn, for the user to type its nickname in;
• a writable text-field passwordEn, for the user to type its password in; and
• a clickable button loginBu, for the user to login, using as its nickname and password
the strings that it typed in the text-fields nicknameEn and passwordEn, respectively. Upon
successful authentication, the user will be directed to the application’s main menu window
menuWi as the logged-in user.
The model shown in Figure 3.7 specifies this login, using the textual notation of GUIML.
Notice that
• The authenticated user should be the registered user in the database whose nickname and
password coincide with the values of the text-variables owned, respectively, by text-fields
nicknameEn and passwordEn. Using our extended OCL, we define the authenticated user
as follows:
ChatUser.allInstances()−>any(u|
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Window loginWi{
TextEntry nicknameEn
TextEntry passwordEn
Button loginBu {
ChatUser loggedUser
Event OnClick{
if(ChatUser.allInstances()−>exists(u|u.nickname=nicknameEn.text
and u.password=passwordEn.text)){
loggedUser := ChatUser.allInstances()−>any (u|
u.nickname=nicknameEn.text and u.password=passwordEn.text)
loggedUser.status := ’on-line’
open menuWi(caller := loggedUser)
}
}
}
}
Figure 3.7: The ChitChat login window.
u.nickname= nicknameEn.text
and u.password=passwordEn.text)
Recall that, as an invariant of the ChitChat data model, we specified that nicknames shall
be unique. Thus, although the any-iterator will return any registered user satisfying the
body of the any-iterator, there will be at most one such registered users.
• The condition for opening the window menuWi should be the existence in the database
of a registered user whose nickname and password coincide with the values of the text-
variables owned, respectively, by text-fields nicknameEn and passwordEn. We define this
condition as follows:
ChatUser.allInstances()−>exists(u|
u.nickname= [nicknameEn.text]
and u.password=[passwordEn.text])
Example 5 (The ChitChat menu window) Consider now the following interface for allowing a
logged-in user to choose an option from ChitChat’s main menu: a window menuWi, owning a
variable caller which stores the logged-in user, and containing:
• a selectable list usersLi with as many rows as registered users are online, each of these
rows containing an unwritable text-field nicknameLa showing the nickname of the regis-
tered user associated to this row;
• a clickable button editProfileBu for the caller to access the interface for editing the profile
(i.e., name, password, email, mood message, and status) of the user selected in the list
usersLi;
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Window menuWi{
ChatUser caller
Role role
Table usersLi {
Sequence(ChatUser) rows := ChatUser.allInstances()−>select(u|u.status=’on−line’)
Label nicknameLa {
String text := row.nickname
}
}
Button editProfileBu {
Event OnClick{
open editProfileWi(selectedUser := usersLi.selected)
}
}
Button createChatBu {
Event OnClick{
open createChatWi()
}
}
Button closeChatBu {
Event OnClick{
back
}
}
}
Figure 3.8: The ChitChat menu window.
• a clickable button createChatBu) for the caller to access the interface for creating a new
chat room; and
• a clickable button closeChatBu for the caller to close the window.
The model shown in in Figure 3.8 specifies this menu window, using the textual notation of
GUIML. Notice that the collection of data items to be displayed in the list usersLi, namely, the
online users, is defined, using the ActionGUI’s extension of OCL, as follows:
ChatUser.allInstances()−>select(u|u.status= ’on−line’)
3.3 Security-aware GUI models
In [9] we spell out our model-driven engineering approach for developing security-aware GUIs
for data-centric applications. The backbone of this approach, illustrated in Figure 3.9, is a
model transformation that automatically lifts the access control policy modeled at the level
of the data to the level of the GUI [6]. More precisely, given a security model (specifying
the access control policy on the application data) and a GUI model (specifying the actions
3.3. Security-aware GUI models 19
Data
Model
Security
Engineer
Software
Engineer
GUI
Engineer
Model Transformation
Code Generation
GUI
Model
Security
Model
Security-aware
GUI Model
Security-aware
GUI Application
Figure 3.9: Model-driven development of security-aware GUIs.
triggered by the events supported by the GUI’s widgets), our model transformation generates
a GUI model that is security-aware. The key idea underlying this transformation is that the
link between visualization and security is ultimately defined in terms of data actions, since data
actions are both controlled by the security policy and triggered by the events supported by the
GUI. Thus, under our approach, the process of modeling and generating security-aware GUIs
has the following parts:
1. Software engineers specify the application-data model (ComponentUML).
2. Security engineers specify the security-design model (SecureUML).
3. GUI designers specify the application GUI model (GUIML).
4. A model transformation automatically generates a security-aware GUI model from the
security model and the GUI model.
5. A code generator automatically produces a security-aware GUI from the security-aware
model.
To support a full model-driven engineering development process, we have built a toolkit,
named the ActionGUI Toolkit [9]. This features specialized model editors for data, security,
and GUI models, and implements the aforementioned model transformation to automatically
generate security-aware GUI models. Moreover, our toolkit includes a code generator that,
given a security-aware GUI model, automatically produces a complete web application, ready
to be deployed in web containers such as Tomcat or GlassFish.
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Example 6 (The ChitChat edit-profile window) To motivate the problem faced by a GUI de-
signer when modeling a security-aware GUI, let us continue with our running example. Con-
sider the interface for allowing a logged-in user caller to edit the profile of a previously chosen
user selectedUser, which may of course be the caller itself. More specifically, this interface shall
consist of a window such that:
1. The current values of the selectedUser’s profile are displayed when opening the window.
2. The caller can type in the new values (if any) for the selectedUser’s profile.
3. The selectedUser’s profile is updated with the new values typed in by the caller when he
or she clicks on a designated button.
Recall that a registered user’s profile is composed of the following attributes: nickname,
password, mood message, email, and status. Recall also that the access control policy for
reading and updating users’ profiles, as specified in Figure 3.5, is the following:
4. A user is always allowed to read and update its own nickname, password, mood message,
email, and status.
5. A user is allowed to read another user’s nickname, mood message, and status, but not the
user’s password or email.
6. An administrator is always allowed to read a user’s nickname, mood message, status, and
email, but not the user’s password.
Now, if the GUI designer only takes into consideration the functional requirements (1–3),
the ChitChat edit-profile window can be modeled as shown in Figure 3.10. Namely, a window
editProfileWi, which owns the variable selectedUser and caller, and contains:
• A writable text-field nicknameEn, for the caller to type in the new value (if any) with which
to update the selectedUser’s nickname. Notice that when the text-field nicknameEn is
created, its “default” variable text will be assigned the current value of the selectedUser’s
nickname, and therefore this value will be the string initially displayed in the text-field
nicknameEn, as requested.
• Analogous writable text-fields for each of the other elements in a registered user’s profile:
password, mood message, email, and status.
• A clickable button updateBu for the caller to trigger the sequence of actions that will
update, as requested, the selectedUser’s nickname, password, mood message, and status,
with the new values (if any) typed by the caller in the corresponding text-fields.
Clearly, the edit-profile window modeled in Figure 3.10 does not satisfy ‘per se’ the security
requirements (4–6): any caller can read and update any value contained in the profile of any
selectedUser! Then, shall we modify the edit-profile window to specify, for each action triggered
by an event, and for each role considered by the ChitChat access control policy, the conditions
under which the given action can be securely executed by a user with the given role? The answer
is ‘No’, since the ActionGUI model transformation will automatically lift the ChitChat access
control policy to the edit-profile window model.
3.3. Security-aware GUI models 21
Window editProfileWi{
ChatUser caller
ChatUser selectedUser
TextEntry nicknameEn{
String text := selectedUser.nickname
}
TextEntry passwordEn{
String text := selectedUser.password
}
TextEntry moodMsgEn{
String text := selectedUser.moodMsg
}
TextEntry emailEn{
String text := selectedUser.email
}
TextEntry statusEn{
String text := selectedUser.status
}
Button updateBu {
Event OnClick{
selectedUser.nickname := nicknameEn.text
selectedUser.password := passwordEn.text
selectedUser.moodMsg := moodMsgEn.text
selectedUser.email := emailEn.text
selectedUser.status := statusEn.text
}
}
}
Figure 3.10: The ChitChat edit-profile window (although security-unaware).
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BPMN
The standard Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) [19] was developed by the Ob-
ject Management Group. “The primary goal of BPMN is to provide a notation that is readily
understandable by all business users, from the business analysts that create the initial drafts of
the processes, to the technical developers responsible for implementing the technology that will
perform those processes, and finally, to the business people who will manage and monitor those
processes.” The intent of BPMN is to standardize a business process model and notation in the
face of many different modeling notations and viewpoints.
There are different types of Diagrams within BPMN. Namely, Process Diagrams, Chore-
ography Diagrams, and Collaborations Diagrams. For the purpose of this work, we are only
interestd in Process Diagrams. In particular, our work is centered around the following model-
ing elements of BPMN Process Diagrams.
Activities
An Activity is work that is performed within a Business Process. An Activity can be Atomic or
Non-Atomic (Compound).
There are different types of Activities within a BPMN Process. Namely, Task Activities,
Sub-Process Activities, and Call Activities. Here we are only interested in Atomic Task Activi-
ties.
Task
A Task is an Atomic Activity within a Process flow. A Task is used when the work in the Process
cannot be broken down to a finer level of detail.
There are different types of Tasks within BPMN. Namely, User Tasks, Service Tasks, Send
Tasks, Receive Tasks, Manual Tasks, Business Rule Tasks, and Script Tasks. Here we are only
interested in User Tasks. A User Task is known as the typical workflow task where a human
performs the task with the assistance of a software application and is scheduled through a task
list manager of some sort. We represent User Tasks as shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Task
Figure 4.2: Flow
Flows
A Sequence Flow is used to show the order of Flow Elements in a Process or a Choreography.
Each Sequence Flow has only one source and only one target. The source and target must be
from the set of the following Flow Elements: Events, Activities, and Gateways.
There are different types of Sequence Flows within BPMN. Namely, Default Flow, Uncon-
troled Flows, Conditional Flows, Exception Flows, Message Flows or Compensation Associa-
tions. Here we are only interested in Uncontroled Flows and Conditional Flows (but only after
Exclusive Gateways). Uncontrolled Flow refers to a flow that is not affected by any conditions
or does not pass through any Gateway. The simplest example of this is a single Sequence Flow
connecting two Activities. Conditional Flow refers to a flow with a condition Expression that is
evaluated at runtime to determine whether or not the flow is continued. We support conditional
flows only after exclusive gateways. We represent Sequence Flows as shown in Figure 4.2.
Events
An Event is something that happens during the course of a Process. Events affect the flow of
the Process and usually have a cause or an impact and in general require or allow for a reaction.
There are three main types of events: Start Events that indicates where a process will start;
End Events which indicate where a path of a process will end; and Intermediate Events which
indicate where something happens somewhere between the start and end of a process. Here we
are only interested in Basic Start and End Events We represent them as shown in Figure 4.3. In
particular, we do not consider the following types of Start Events: Message, Timer, Conditional,
Signal, Multiple, Parallel Multiple. Also, we do not consider the following types of End Events:
Message, Escalation, Error, Cancel, Compensation, Signal, Terminate, and Multiple.
(a) Start Event (b) End Event
Figure 4.3: Events
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(a) Exclusive Gateway (b) Parallel Gateway
Figure 4.4: Gateways
(a) Exclusive Gateway (b) Exclusive Gateway
Multiple Outputs Multiple Inputs
Figure 4.5: Exclusive Gateways
Gateways
Gateways are used to control how flows interact as they converge and diverge within a Process.
If the flow does not need to be controlled, then a Gateway is not needed. The term Gateway
implies that there is a gating mechanism that either allows or disallows passage through the
Gateway–that is, as tokens arrive at a Gateway, they can be merged together on input and/or
split apart on output as the Gateway mechanisms are invoked. Gateways can define all the types
of Sequence Flow behavior: Decisions/branching (exclusive, inclusive, and complex), merging,
forking, and joining. Here we are only interested in Exclusive and Parallel Gateways. We
represent them as shown in Figure 4.4
Exclusive Gateway
A diverging Exclusive Gateway is used to create alternative paths within a Process flow. This
is basically the diversion point in the road for a Process. For a given instance of the Process,
only one of the paths can be taken. A Decision can be thought of as a question that is asked at
a particular point in the Process. The question has a defined set of alternative answers. Each
answer is associated with a condition Expression that is associated with a Gateway’s outgoing
Sequence Flows. We also refer to this kind of exclusive gateway as exclusive gateway multiple
outputs. We represent them as shown in Figure 4.5(a).
A converging Exclusive Gateway is used to merge alternative paths. We also refer to this
gateway as exclusive gateway multiple input. We represent them as shown in Figure 4.5(b).
Each incoming Sequence Flow token is routed to the outgoing Sequence Flow without synchro-
nization.
Parallel Gateway
A Parallel Gateway is used to synchronize parallel flows and to create parallel flows. A Parallel
Gateway creates parallel paths without checking any conditions. Each outgoing Sequence Flow
receives a token upon execution of this Gateway. We represent them as shown in Figure 4.6(a).
We also refers refer to this Gateway as parallel gateway forking.
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(a) Parallel Gateway (b) Parallel Gateway
Forking Joining
Figure 4.6: Parallel gateways
For incoming flows, the Parallel Gateway will wait for all incoming flows before triggering
the flow through its outgoing Sequence Flows. We represent them as shown in Figure 4.6(b).
We also refer to this Gateway as parallel gateway joining.
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From BPMN to ActionGUI
In this and the next chapter we present our methodology for developing secure business appli-
cations from Secure BPMN models. In a nutshell, our proposal is a three-step process. In the
first step, ActionGUI models are automatically generated from the given secure BPMN model.
These ActionGUI models specify the high-level behaviour of the desired business application,
based on the information contained in the given BPMN model. This first step is indeed the
cornerstone of our proposal. It is grounded on a novel mapping from Secure BPMN models to
ActionGUI models. We define here this mapping, in 5.1 and 5.2, for BPMN models without
SoD and BoD requirements, and we extend it, in the next section, to cover as well the afore-
mentioned requirements. Then, in the second step, the modeler will complete the generated
ActionGUI models with all the relevant information about the desired business application that
can not be expressed in the given BPMN model. This second step is illustrated in Sections 5.3
and 5.4 with an example. Finally, in the third step, the desired business application will be au-
tomatically generated from the finalized models, using the available ActionGUI code generator.
For the purpose of this work, this last step of our proposal is not particularly relevant. See [5]
for further information.
In what follows, given a BPMN modelW, we denote by bp2ag(W) the ActionGUI model
that corresponds to W, according to our mapping. The model bp2ag(W) is the outcome of
the first-step in our methodology. Also, given an ActionGUI model bp2ag(W), we denote its
data model and its gui model, respectively, by bp2ag_dm(W) and bp2ag_gm(W). The security
model of an ActionGUI model bp2ag(W) will play no role in our mapping.
5.1 Generating the business process data model
For any BPMN modelW, the (generic) business process data model bp2ag_dm(W) is shown in
Figure 5.1, where A1,. . ., An should be replaced by the names of the activities inW. Basically,
the enumerated entity Activity models the activities inW. The entity Task models the instances
of the activities in W. Its attributes status and type model, respectively, the current status of
the task and its activity type, while its association-ends process and agent model, respectively,
the process to which the task belongs and the agent that executes the task. The entity Process
models the instances ofW. Its attribute id models the process number. Finally, the entity Agent
models the business process agents.
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enumEntity Activity{
A1, . . ., An
}
entity Task{
String status
Activity type
Process process oppositeTo tasks
Agent agent oppositeTo tasks
}
entity Process{
Integer id
Set(Task) tasks oppositeTo process
}
entity Agent {
Set(Task) tasks oppositeTo agent
}
Figure 5.1: The (generic) model bp2ag_dm(W).
5.2 Generating the business process GUI model
For any BPMN model W, the (generic) business process GUI model bp2ag_gm(W) consists
of:
• A task management window, named TaskMng, where agents can create a new process
and/or choose the next task to be executed.
• For each activity A inW, a task execution window, named TaskOK_A, where agents can
execute to completion a previously chosen task of type A.
5.2.1 The tasks management window
It contains two widgets: a button NewProcess, for creating a new process, and a table TaskList,
for choosing among the pending tasks the next one to be executed.
The definition of the button NewProcess is given in Figure 5.2, where first(W) should be
replaced by the name of the first activity inW. Basically,
• The button is labeled ’New’.
• When the button is clicked-on, a new instance newProc of the entity Process is created.
Also, a new instance newTask of the entity Task is created, with its attributes status and
type set, respectively, to ’Pending’ and first(W). Finally, the newly created task is linked
to the newProc.
The definition of the table TaskList is given in Figure 5.3, where A1, . . . , An should be re-
placed by the names of the activities inW. Basically,
• The rows in the table TaskList are the pending tasks.
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Button NewProcess{
String text := ’New’
Event onClick{
newProc := new Process
newTask := new Task
newTask.status := ’Pending’
newTask.process += newProc
newTask.type := first(W)
}
}
Figure 5.2: The (generic) model bp2ag_gm(W). The button NewProcess.
• There are four columns in the table TaskList. For each row,
– the first column shows the number of the process to which the row, i.e., the task
associated to this row, belongs;
– the second column shows the type of the row;
– the third column shows the status of the row; and,
– the fourth column contains a button, named Run.
• For each row, when the button Run is clicked-on,
– It changes the status of the row to ’Running’;
– It links the row to the instance of the entity Agent that models the caller, i.e., the
current user.
– If the row is an instance of an activity Ai, for i = 1, . . . , n, it opens the window
TaskOK_Ai, and set its variable selTask (whose role is to hold the task to be com-
pleted in this window) to row.
5.2.2 The task execution windows
Each window TaskOK_A simply contains a button, named OK. When this button is clicked-
on, the state of the current process is changed depending on what follows the activity A inW.
Logically, for each of the possible follow-ups, there is a different definition of the button OK.
Also, each window TaskOK_A owns a variable selTask, which holds the task of type A to be
completed. In the remaining of this section, we specify, for a selection of possible follow-ups,
the actions triggered by the on-click event of the button OK
Simple flow Its definition is given in Figure 5.4, where A1 and A2 should be replaced by the
corresponding activities inW. Basically, when the button OK is clicked-on:
• It changes the status of selTask to ’Completed’.
• It creates a new instance newTask of the entity Task, with its attribute status set to ’Pending’
and its attribute activity set to A2. Also, it links newTask to the same process to which
selTask belongs.
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Table TaskList{
Sequence(Task) rows :=
Task.allInstances()−>select(t|t.status = ’Pending’)
Label Process{
String text := row.process.id
}
Label Activity{
String text := row.type
}
Label Status{
String text := row.status
}
Button Run{
Event onClick{
row.status := ’Running’
row.agent += caller
if (row.type = A1) {
open TaskOK_A1 (selTask := row)
}
...
if (row.type = An) {
open TaskOK_An (selTask := row)
} } }
Figure 5.3: The (generic) model bp2ag_gm(W). The table TaskList.
Button Ok{
String text := ’OK’
Event onClick {
selTask.status := ’Completed’
newTask := new Task
newTask.status := ’Pending’
newTask.type := A2
newTask.process += selTask.process
}
}
Figure 5.4: The (generic) model bp2ag_gm(W). The button OK (simple flow).
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Button Ok{
String text := ’OK’
Event onClick {
selTask.status := ’Completed’
newTask_1 := new Task
newTask_1.status := ’Pending’
newTask_1.type := A1
newTask_1.process += selTask.process
...
newTask_N := new Task
newTask_N.status := ’Pending’
newTask_N.type := A_n
newTask_N.process += selTask.process
}
}
Figure 5.5: The (generic) model bp2ag_gm(W). The button OK (forking).
Forking Its definition is given in Figure 5.5, where A1, . . . , An should be replaced by the
corresponding activities inW. Basically, when the button OK is clicked-on:
• It changes the status of the selTask to ’Completed’.
• For each activity A1, . . . , An, it creates a new instance newTask_i of the entity Task, with
its attributes status and type set, respectively, to ’Pending’ and Ai. Also, the newly created
task is linked to the process to which selTask belongs.
Joining Its definition is given in Figure 5.6, where A1, . . . , An and A should be replaced by
the corresponding activities inW. Basically, when the button OK is clicked-on:
• It changes the status of selTask to ’Completed’.
• If A1, . . . , An are completed, then it creates a new instance newTask of the entity Task,
with its attribute status set to ’Pending’ and its attribute activity set to A. Also, it links
newTask to the same process to which selTask belongs.
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Button Ok{
String text := ’OK’
Event onClick {
selTask.status := ’Completed’
if (Set{A1, . . . , An}−>forAll(a|
selTask.process.tasks−>exists(t|
t.type=a and t.status=’Completed’)))
{
newTask := new Task
newTask.status := ’Pending’
newTask.type := A
newTask.process += selTask.process
}
}
}
}
Figure 5.6: The (generic) model bp2ag_gm(W). The button OK (joining).
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Button Ok{
String text := ’OK’
Event onClick {
selTask.status := ’Completed’
newTask := new Task
newTask.status := ’Pending’
newTask.type := A
newTask.process += selTask.process
}
}
Figure 5.7: The (generic) model bp2ag_gm(W). The button OK (exclusive gateway multiple
input).
Exclusive gateway multiple input Its definition is given Figure 5.7, where A should be
replaced by the corresponding activity inW. Basically, when the button OK is clicked-on:
• It changes the status of selTask to ’Completed’.
• It creates a new instance newTask of the entity Task, with its attribute status set to ’Pending’
and its attribute activity set to A. Also, it links newTask to the same process to which
selTask belongs.
Exclusive gateway multiple output Its definition is given in Figure 5.8, where A1, . . . , An
and A should be replaced by the corresponding activities inW. Basically, when the button OK
is clicked-on:
• It changes the status of selTask to ’Completed’.
• It evaluates the conditions from top to bottom, and the body of the first condition that
evaluates to true is performed, and the rest are skipped.
• Thus, if the condi evaluates to true, the model creates a new instance newTask of the entity
Task, with its attribute status set to ’Pending’ and its attribute activity set to Ai. Also, it
links newTask to the same process to which selTask belongs.
Ending Its definition is given in Figure 5.9. Basically, when the button OK is clicked-on:
• It changes the status of selTask to ’Completed’.
34 5. From BPMN to ActionGUI
Button Ok{
String text := ’OK’
Event onClick {
selTask.status := ’Completed’
if(cond1){
newTask := new Task
newTask.status := ’Pending’
newTask.type := A1
newTask.process += selTask.process
}
...
else if (condn){
newTask := new Task
newTask.status := ’Pending’
newTask.type := An
newTask.process += selTask.process
}
}
}
Figure 5.8: The (generic) model bp2ag_gm(W). The button OK (exclusive gateway multiple
output).
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Button Ok{
String text := ’OK’
Event onClick {
selTask.status := ’Completed’
}
}
Figure 5.9: The (generic) model bp2ag_gm(W). The button OK (ending).
Figure 5.10: Holidays: a Secure BPMN model for processing holiday requests.
5.3 Completing the business process data model
In Figure 5.10 we show a simple Secure BPMN model, name Holidays. It specifies how to
process holiday requests. The process starts with the activity Request (a request is submitted
by an employee) and it ends with the activity Answer (the request is answered). Interestingly,
before the activity Answer is executed, two other activities need to be completed, possibly in
parallel: namely, HR_Evaluation (a staff member of the HR department evaluates the request)
and Management_Evaluation (a manager evaluates the request). It also specifies two security
requirements: (i) an SoD requirement, namely, that the HR staff member and the manager that
evaluate a request must not be the same person; and (ii) a BoD requirement, namely, that the
person that answers a request must be the same HR staff member than evaluates the request.
Recall that the generic business process data model does not fully specify the domain of
the business process Holidays. Within our methodology, this should be done by the modeler
by extending the generic business process data model. To illustrate this step, we show in Fig-
ure 5.11 an extension of bp2ag_dm(Holidays) that (partially) models the domain of the business
process Holidays. In particular, it includes an entity Request that models the holiday requests.
Its attribute days models the total number of days that are requested, while its association-ends
process models the process to which the requests belongs.
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entity Request{
Integer days
Boolean approvedHR
Boolean approvedManager
Process process oppositeTo request
}
entity Process{
Request request oppositeTo process
}
entity Employee{
String name
Agent asAgent oppositeTo asEmployee
}
entity Agent{
Employee asEmployee oppositeTo asAgent
}
Figure 5.11: Completing the data model bp2ag_dm(Holidays).
5.4 Completing the business process GUI model
Recall that the generic business process GUI model does not specify how a task is to be com-
pleted: e.g., which inputs (if any) the agent has to provide, how the agent is to provide these
inputs, which properties (if any) these inputs need to satisfy, and so on. Within our methodology,
all these details (which are, however, very relevant for the correctness and usability of a busi-
ness application) are specified by the modeler by extending the definitions of the task execution
windows in the generic business process GUI model.
To illustrate this step we show in Figure 5.12 an extension of the definition of the window
TaskOK_Request that take into consideration that (i) we have modeled holiday requests using
the entity Request, and that (ii) all requests have an attribute days that indicates the number of
days which are requested. In particular, the window TaskOK_Request includes a text field Days,
for writing the number of days which are request. Now, when the button OK is clicked-on (in
addition to the expected actions, given that what follows is a parallel gateway forking):
• It creates a new instance newRequest of the entity Request and set its attribute days to
the number written in the text field Days. Also, it links the newly created request to the
process to which selTask belongs.
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Window TaskOK_Request{
Task selTask
Label Number{
String text := ’Total: ’
}
TextEntry Days
Button OK{
String text := ’OK’
Event onClick{
newRequest := new Request
newRequest.process += selTask.process
newRequest.days := Days.text.toInteger()
newTask_1 := new Task
newTask_1.status := ’Pending’
newTask_1.type := HR_Evaluation
newTask_1.process += selTask.process
newTask_2 := new Task
newTask_2.status := ’Pending’
newTask_2.type := Management_Evaluation
newTask_2.process += selTask.process
}
}
}
Figure 5.12: Completing the GUI model bp2ag_dm(Holidays). The window TaskOK_Request
(2 step).
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From Secure BPMN to
ActionGUI
The only difference between a BPMN model and a Secure BPMN model is that the latter speci-
fies also two symmetric relations, representing separation of duties (SoD) and binding of duties
(BoD) policies, on the business processW
SoDW, BoDW ⊂ ActivityW × ActivityW
where ActivityW are the activities inW. These relations impose the following constraints on
W:
• Let p be aW-process and let A, A′ be a pair of activities inW such that (A, A′) ∈ SoDW.
Then, if an agent has performed a task of type A in p, then he/she must not perform the
corresponding task of type A′ in p.
• Let p be aW-process and let A, A′ be a pair of activities inW such that (A, A′) ∈ BoDW.
Then, if an agent has performed a task of type A in p, then he/she must perform the
corresponding task of type A′ in p.
To capture SoD and BoD requirements in our mapping from BPMN models to ActionGUI
model we only need to modify the definition of the button Run in the table TaskList in the
task management window TaskMng. In Figure 6.1 we show our definition of the SoD and
BoD security-aware table TaskList, where, A1, . . . , An should be replaced by the names of the
activities in W, and, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, SoDW(Ai) and BoDW(Ai) should be replaced by the
following sets:
SoDW(Ai) = {A′ | SoDW(Ai, A′)}
BoDW(Ai) = {A′ | BoDW(Ai, A′)}
According to this new definition, when the button Run is clicked-on, the status of the row
will be changed to ’Running’ (and, subsequently, the corresponding window TaskOK will be
opened), only if the applicable SoD and BoD constraints are satisfied, taking into consideration:
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Button Run{
Event onClick{
if(row.type = A1) {
if (caller.tasks
−>select(t|t.process = row.process)
−>forAll(t| SoDW(A1)−>excludes(t.type))
and
row.process.tasks
−>select(t| BoDW(A1)−>includes(t.type))
−>forAll(t|t.agent = caller}))
{
row.status := ’Running’
row.agent += caller
open TaskOK_A1( selTask := row)
}
}
...
if(row.type = An) {
if (caller.tasks
−>select(t|t.process = row.process)
−>forAll(t| SoDW(An)−>excludes(t.type))
and
row.process.tasks
−>select(t| BoDW(An)−>includes(t.type))
−>forAll(t|t.agent = caller))
{
row.status := ’Running’
row.agent += caller
open TaskOK_An( selTask := row)
}
}
}
}
Figure 6.1: The (generic) model bp2ag_gm(W). The SoD and BoD security-aware table
TaskList.
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(i) the type of the row (i.e., of the task whose status is to be changed) and (ii) the tasks that the
caller owns within the process to which rows belongs.
To illustrate this extension of our mapping, we apply it to our running example: namely, the
business process Holidays. According to the Secure BPMN model shown in Figure 5.10, these
are the SoD and BoD relations restricting the business process Holidays:
SoDHolidays = {(HR_Evaluation, Management_Evaluation)}
BoDHolidays = {(HR_Evaluation, Answer)}
In the Figure 6.2 the table TaskList of the model bp2ag_gm(Holiday) is showed. Some
simplifications were made for the sake of simplicity, based on the following facts:
• forAll(t|Set{}−>excludes(t.type))= true.
• select(t|Set{}−>includes(t.type))−>forAll(t|t.agent = caller)= true
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Button Run{
Event onClick{
if(row.type = HR_Evaluation) {
if (caller.tasks
−>select(t|t.process = row.process)
−>forAll(t|Set{Management_Evaluation})−>excludes(t.type)
and
row.process.tasks
−>select(t|Set{Answer})−>includes(t.type)
−>forAll(t|t.agent = caller))
{
row.status := ’Running’
row.agent += caller
open TaskOK_HR_Evaluation( selTask := row)
}
}
if(row.type = Management_Evaluation) {
if (caller.tasks
−>select(t|t.process = row.process)
−>forAll(t|Set{HR_Evaluation})−>excludes(t.type))
{
row.status := ’Running’
row.agent += caller
open TaskOK_Management_Evaluation( selTask := row)
}
}
if(row.type = Answer) {
if (row.process.tasks
−>select(t|Set{HR_Evaluation})−>includes(t.type)
−>forAll(t|t.agent = caller))
{
row.status := ’Running’
row.agent += caller
open TaskOK_Answer( selTask := row)
}
}
if(row.type = Request)
{
row.status := ’Running’
row.agent += caller
open TaskOK_Request( selTask := row)
}
}
}
Figure 6.2: The model bp2ag_gm(Holiday). The SoD and BoD security-aware table TaskList.
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Tooling support
In this section we show the steps involved in the transformation of a Secure BPMN model into
its corresponding Secure Business Application. For each step in the transformation we describe
the procedure used, the input required, the output produced, and expose the existent drawbacks
along with their possible solutions.
Figure 7.1: Steps performed to obtain the Secure Business Process Application
In Figure 7.1 we show a diagram that has a chain of rectangular shaped boxes. From box
to box, the Secure BPMN model is transformed and completed. Between each box there are
two labels, the one on the left is just to enumerate the steps, while the one on the right is the
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Figure 7.2: Files generated by SBP2AG Mapping (Holidays)
process used in each transformation step. Some of the steps also have a person on its right, that
means the step requires manual intervention. The step that does not have a person on the right
are performed automatically. The diagram also has a square box named Transformation Tool,
that is a tool that we have developed as part of our work. It is composed of the Model Loader
and SBP2AG Mapping.
Step 1: Model Loader. The Secure BPMN model is loaded into its java representation.
The BPMN standard, provides the standard XML representation for BPMN graphical models.
We use Signavio to obtain the XML representation of a BPMN graphical model. Signavio
automatically transforms the graphical business process into the XML representation and vice
versa. We have developed a parser to load the XML representation of a BPMN model into its
Java representation (limited to BPMN models that we are interested in)
Step 2: SBP2AG Mapping. It automatically performs the map from the Secure BPMN
model’s java representation to the corresponding ActionGUI model. Given a Secure BPM model
W, named nameW, which contains the activities a1, . . . , an. The tool generates a folder named
nameW, as the one shown in Figure 7.2. This folder contains:
• A file named bp2ag_dmW that has the data model.
• A folder named bp2ag_agW containing:
– A file named TaskMng which has the TaskMng window model. This model includes
all the SoD and BoD constraints defined onW
– For each ai in a1, . . . , an, a file named TaskOK_aiW contains the execution window
that models the completion window for each activity inW.
Step 3: Complete the GUI-models. The ActionGUI model generated in the previous step
is completed by the modeler.
Step 4: ActionGUI toolkit It generates a web application ready to be deployed. This is
automatically done by the ActionGUI toolkit.
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Conclusions and future work
In this work we have proposed a methodology for developing secure business applications from
Secure BPMN models. To the best of our knowledge, the current BPMN business application
development tools do not provide support for Secure BPMN models. In addition, in our method-
ology, the many details about a business application that can not be expressed in a BPMN model
are specified by the modeler using ActionGUI, saving him/her the hassle of having to manually
encode them, as it is typically the case in the available BPMN business application development
tools.
We plan to extend our mapping to cover all the standard BPMN language. Dealing with
cycles, in particular, may introduce some additional complexity to our mapping when combined
with SoD or BoD requirements. Finally, we plan to extend Secure BPMN by allowing to further
precise the SoD and BoD requirements using OCL expressions (which will play a role analogous
to the so-called authorization constraints in SecureUML). By doing so, we expect to be able to
security requirements like the following: “Since John and Jack are brothers, the should not be
able to approve each other’s orders.”
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